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Four Scenarios for the Reintegration of Residents of Occupied Territories: From the Restoration of the 1991 Borders to the Loss of New Territories

These are the results of a two-day session during which 40 Ukrainian and international participants formulated key questions related to the reintegration of Ukrainians currently living in territories temporarily occupied by Russia. The session took place on February 19–20, 2024, in Lviv, bringing together Ukrainian and foreign experts — intellectuals from the legal, humanitarian, cultural, and military sectors.
The expert discussion was initiated, organized, and supported by the Charitable Foundation “Health Solutions for an Open Society,” the UCU Law School, and the Ukrainian Catholic University.
Below is a brief overview of the scenarios. A full version is available at the end.

Scenario 1: Ukraine Restores the 1991 Borders

Up to 20% of the population in the temporarily occupied territories are estimated to be engaged in voluntary collaboration with the occupiers. However, Ukraine likely should not attempt to prosecute all of these individuals.
Firstly, as shown by the experiences of de-occupied cities, courts can prove to be ineffective.
Secondly, for those who have not committed serious crimes, it is better to seek paths of reconciliation, such as the establishment of reconciliation commissions — a model that ensures justice is balanced with mercy, involving local communities. If not the church, then perhaps a "council of elders" at the community level could make such decisions. The result should be a new stage of lustration.
At the same time, individuals who committed serious crimes during the occupation must be held accountable. Declaring a blanket amnesty for everyone would cause the reintegration process to fail.
All de-occupied territories will require a special legal status, as reintegration should proceed in stages. This is also to prevent these territories from radically affecting the rest of the country.
Ukraine will need to adopt a liberal policy on language and religion. Reconciliation means a space of dignity, not humiliation. For instance, the best way to keep Crimea within Ukraine is to recognize its distinctiveness.
Unless radical reforms take place in Russia, Ukraine should speak not of peace, but of a ceasefire. Moreover, Russian saboteurs will remain in the de-occupied territories, so there must be a focus on preventing future collaboration.

Scenario 2: Partial Restoration of Control over Occupied Territories

This refers, for example, to regaining control up to the line of contact as it was before the full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022. In such a scenario, Ukraine faces the challenges of reintegrating the population that has lived under occupation since 2014 and of economic recovery.
Here too, it is essential to distinguish between "adaptation without collaboration" and actual "collaboration." Overall, the rate of collaboration in occupied territories is relatively low. Examples from Kherson and Kharkiv regions show that active collaborators often flee after de-occupation. Everyone wishing to relocate to Russia should be allowed to do so.
In this scenario, the population of the de-occupied territories will decrease.
The biggest loss in this scenario may be the group of moderately pro-Ukrainian citizens — those who hoped for de-occupation but did not see it happen due to setbacks by the Defense Forces. As a result, they develop critical attitudes toward Ukrainian leadership.
How to repopulate the territories abandoned by occupiers and collaborators? Options include voluntary relocation of Ukrainians from other regions encouraged by economic incentives and patriotic motivations, as well as seeking migrants from Europe, America, Asia, and Africa.

Scenario 3: The Frontline Becomes Frozen

Frontline areas enter into a special regime. Ukraine faces the task of engaging with the population under occupation and managing social connections with them.
Ukraine temporarily accepts territorial losses in exchange for EU and NATO membership. This would buy time to build up capacity.
People in temporarily occupied territories must feel the legitimacy of Ukrainian authority and know that they are being listened to and heard.

Scenario 4: Loss of New Territories

In this scenario, Ukraine faces the challenge of working with the population under occupation and managing social connections with those living in special-regime areas near the new contact line.
It is crucial to stress the unethical nature of "land for security" proposals and to highlight the disillusionment of occupied Ukrainians with the realities of Russian rule.
Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are a vital link between Ukraine and the temporarily occupied territories. At the same time, the state must create institutions of sustained influence to shape long-term public opinion across generations.
Resistance is the most important marker. Even the use of surzhyk (a Ukrainian-Russian mixed language) has become a tool of resistance, helping people easily identify who is “ours” and who is not.